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Exploring the Nexus Test for Asserting Jurisdiction
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act:
Vencedora Oceanica Navigacion, S.A. v.
Compagnie Nationale Algerienne De
Navigation (C.N.A.N.)
In Vencedora Oceanica Navigacion, S.A. v. Compagnie Nationale Alger-
ienne De Navigation (C.N.A.N.)I the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit confronted the issue whether commercial activity in
the United States that is unrelated to the plaintiffs cause of action is
sufficient for United States courts to assert jurisdiction over a foreign
governmental defendant. Cases involving foreign governmental de-
fendants operate outside the minimum contacts jurisdictional frame-
work and are governed instead by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA). 2 The ambiguous language of the FSIA in general, and
section 1605(a)(2) in particular, has rendered it difficult for courts to
determine the scope of the jurisdiction granted.
In Vencedora the court rejected plaintiffs argument that the "sub-
stantial contacts" clause of section 1605(a)(2) is analogous to a state
long-arm "doing business" statute, and therefore, confers jurisdic-
tion in cases in which the defendant carries on a sufficient volume of
unrelated commercial activity in the United States. Instead of apply-
ing a doing business jurisdictional test, the court posited a "commer-
cial nexus" test. Under this test, to assert subject matter jurisdiction,
a court must connect the cause of action to the foreign governmental
agency's commercial activity in the United States. Under the facts of
Vencedora, such a nexus was found not to exist.3
The dispute in Vencedora arose when plaintiffs tanker, the
Kapetan Marcos, en route to Spain with a cargo of Egyptian oil,
caught fire and was abandoned 170 miles off the Algerian coast.
Compagnie Nationale Algerienne De Navigation (CNAN), a publicly
owned corporation of the Algerian government, dispatched tugs to
retrieve the vessel. CNAN refused to release the ship until plaintiff, a
Panamanian corporation, posted a bond securing compensation for
730 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1984).
2 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2),(3),(4), 1391(0, 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1982). The
FSIA is tailored to comport with the traditional requirements of minimum contacts.
3 Vencedora, 730 F.2d at 203-04.
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the salvage service. The parties were unable to agree on a figure and
the Kapetan Marcos remained in Algerian waters, cargo intact. 4
Following a storm that ran the ship aground, Algerian officials
notified plaintiffs that the ship was a "wreck" within the definition of
the country's maritime code. Consequently, they declared plaintiffs
ownership rights void. The Algerian Code stipulates that forfeited
wrecks are subject to public sale, with the proceeds earmarked for
the Establishment for Social Protection of Seamen. 5  Plaintiffs
brought suit against CNAN for tortious deprivation of property. 6
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
over defendant. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, re-
jecting plaintiffs' contention that the court acquired jurisdiction
under either the commercial exceptions or expropriation sections of
the FSIA. The court focused its discussion on the commercial excep-
tions, dispensing with the expropriation section in cursory fashion. 7
The court held that CNAN's general commercial conduct in the
United States did not, standing alone, create an environment in
which plaintiffs could invoke the commercial exceptions. The ab-
sence of a nexus between defendant's commercial activity in the
United States and its salvage operation in the Mediterranean
prompted the court to dismiss the case.
The court noted several reasons for favoring a nexus test inter-
pretation of the commercial exceptions clause over plaintiffs' doing
business construction. First, it noted that the international commu-
nity is more favorably disposed to the nexus concept.8 Second, it
contrasted the language of the commercial exceptions section to that
contained in the expropriation section. The latter's unmistakable
reference to a doing business test, the court reasoned, illustrates that
Congress knew the proper wording for defining the test. The ab-
sence of such language in the commercial exceptions section there-
4 Id. at 196.
5 Id. at 196-97.
6 Id. at 197.
7 Id. at 204. The court held that defendant's possession and control over the
Kapetan Marcos was not tantamount to ownership or operation. Therefore, § 1605(a)(3)
did not apply. It suggested the agency that began forfeiture proceedings against the ship
could be accused of exercising ownership, but it did not do business in the United States.
Section 1605(a)(3) is rarely used by aggrieved plaintiffs. But see De Sanchez v. Banco Cen-
tral De Nicaragua, 515 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. La. 1981) (§ 1605(a)(3) applied because the
United States was focal point of transaction). See Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and
their Cotporations, Part I, 85 COM. L.J. 228, 233-34 (1980) for a terse overview of
§ 1605(a)(3). For an earlier study of the expropriation question, see von Mehren, The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRASNAT'L L. 33, 57-61 (1978). The
expropriation issue is also discussed in Kahale & Vega, Immunity andJurisdiction: Toward a
Uniform Body of Law In Actions Against Foreign States, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 252-58
(1979).
8 Vencedora, 730 F.2d at 202.
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fore indicates that Congress consciously had chosen not to adopt it.9
Third, the court observed that the larger volume of litigation
resulting from a doing business construction might overburden the
courts.' 0 Fourth, it noted that the Fifth Circuit itself had moved to-
ward the test in an earlier decision. I I Finally, the opinion stressed
the need for uniformity among the courts in the area of sovereign
immunity, alluding to the Third Circuit's adoption of the nexus
approach. 12
Judge Higginbotham dissented, stating that the court had placed
undue emphasis on finding a connection between the cause of action
and defendant's commerical activity in the United States. He ac-
cepted the doing business test, arguing that it was consistent with
Congress' objective of expanding subject matter jurisdiction over
foreign governments acting commercially. According to Higginbot-
ham, Congress' silence should be construed as tacit approval of a
doing business construction of the commercial exceptions. He
agreed with his colleagues, however, that the expropriation section
did not apply.'13
Both the commercial and expropriation sections emanate from
the restrictive sovereign immunity doctrine, which is premised on
the notion that foreign sovereigns should not enjoy blanket immu-
nity from suit. 14 Although the United States generally has adhered
to the doctrine since the early 1950s,15 it was not until 1976 that
Congress codified the restrictive theory by adopting the FSIA. 16
The FSIA transferred the power to decide whether a foreign
government could invoke sovereign immunity from the State Depart-
ment to the Judiciary.1 7 The presumption under the FSIA is that the
9 Id.
10 Id.
I I ld. at 203. See Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir.
1980); see also infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
12 Vencedora, 730 F.2d at 203.
13 Id. at 205 (Higginbotham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14 Under "this view, a foreign sovereign acting in a private capacity could be sued for
wrongs arising from those private acts in the ordinary courts of the host country. For
wrongs arising out of a foreign sovereign's public acts, the only redress would be found, if
at all, in the courts . . . of that foreign sovereign." Dellapenna, Part II, supra note 7, at
230.
15 26 U.S. DEP'T ST. BULL. 984, 985 (1952). This document, known as the "Tate
letter," formally announced that the United States was abandoning the doctrine of abso-
lute immunity for foreign sovereigns.
16 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2),(3),(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1982).
17 H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6606 [hereinafter cited as "HousE REPORT"]. As one commentator has put it, plain-
tiffs are "no longer. . . forced to compete with the foreign policy interests of the United
States for the State Department's favor." Kahale & Vega, supra note 7, at 220.
This is not to say the executive branch's involvement was without benefit. Before
enactment of the FSIA, the State Department conveniently ferreted out frivolous claims,
obviating the burdens of litigation. Under current law, by contrast, a foreign sovereign
must respond directly to the charge in court, a process that surely encourages plaintiffs to
1985]
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defendant is entitled to sovereign immunity.' 8 The presumption is
overcome, however, when a court concludes that one of the FSIA
exceptions applies. By eliminating the defendant's sovereign immu-
nity claim, the requirements of personal and subject matter jurisdic-
tion are also satisfied, and the court may proceed to the merits of the
case. 19
The commercial exceptions section, section 1605(a)(2), has
been characterized as "the core of FSIA." 20 It describes three situa-
tions in which a defendant may not assert sovereign immunity. All
three exceptions use the term "commercial activity," which is de-
fined as "either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particu-
lar commercial transaction or act." 21 The first exception denies
foreign sovereign immunity when "the action is based upon a com-
mercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state." 22 Section 1603(e) further explains that this means "commer-
cial activity carried on by such state and having 'substantial contact'
with the United States." 23 A defendant's actions may fall within this
"substantial, contacts" exception despite the fact that the actions
were partially performed outside the United States.2 4
The second exception, the "territoriality exception," abolishes
immunity in suits based upon acts "performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of a foreign state else-
where."2 5 The third exception, the "direct effects" exception, elimi-
nates immunity in cases in which an act occurs outside the United
States "in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere which . . . causes a direct effect in the United States."2 6
The legislative history of the commerical exceptions section
reveals that Congress intended to allow a significant measure of in-
terpretative discretion. 27 Consequently, the appellate and district
courts have articulated differing constructions.
Two decisions by the Third Circuit discuss the substantial con-
pursue frivolous claims. Hill, A Policy Analysis of the American Law of Foreign State Immunity, 50
FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 198-99 (1981).
18 See Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and their Corporations, Part 1, 85 COM. L.J.
167 (1980). But see Kane, Suing Foreign Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass, 34 STANFORD L.
REV. 385, 386 (1982) (contending that sovereign immunity is usually treated as an affirma-
tive defense).
19 See Kane, supra note 18, at 386-87. Section 1330(a) conveys subject matterjurisdic-
tion; § 1330(b) grants personal jurisdiction whenever § 1330(a) is met.
20 Dellapenna, Part II, supra note 7, at 230.
21 28 U.S.C. § 1603(c) (1982).
22 Id. § 1605(a)(2).
23 Id. § 1603(e).
24 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 6615.
25 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1982). For the purposes of this note the second exception
will be referred to as the "territoriality clause."
26 Id.
27 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 6615.
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tacts clause of the FSIA's commercial exceptions section. In
Sugarman v. Aeromexico 28 the court applied the clause to hold liable a
foreign government-owned airline that had caused personal injury to
an American in Mexico. Plaintiff had suffered a heart attack while
awaiting an overdue flight back to the United States. Focusing on
defendant's commercial contact with plaintiff in the United States,
the Sugarman court found substantial contact. Significantly, it used
the word "nexus" to describe the relation between plaintiff's claim
and defendant's commercial activity in the United States.
29
In Velidor v. L/P/G Benghazi3 0 Yugoslavian seamen sued their
employers for nonpayment of wages. As in Sugarman, the Velidor
court examined defendant's related commercial activity in the United
States and found that the substantial contacts clause applied. It ob-
served that the foundation of plaintiffs' cause of action, the Seaman's
Wage Act, became operative only upon the vessel's entry into Ameri-
can waters, thus overcoming the presumption of sovereign immu-
nity. The court stated, however, that the determination turned upon




In Gemini Shipping v. Foreign Trade Organization for Chemicals and
Foodstuffs3 2 the Second Circuit applied the substantial contacts clause
to uphold jurisdiction in a suit against a foreign sovereign. The Syr-
ian government had purchased rice in the United States and had
agreed to pay any demurrage incurred during shipping. 33 Subse-
quently, Syria refused to honor its promise to pay, and Gemini
brought suit in the United States. The court refused Syria's claim of
sovereign immunity, because Syria's promise to pay demurrage arose
out of the purely commercial contract to purchase rice in the United
States. 34
The Second Circuit also interpreted the substantial contacts
clause in Ministry of Supply v. Universe Tankships, Inc. 35 In Universe
Tankships Egypt had purchased wheat in the United States. Plaintiff
filed a claim against Egypt for wrongfully delaying the ship that car-
ried the wheat. Viewing the wheat sale in its entirety and treating the
delay as merely the last leg of the commercial activity, the court
28 626 F.2d 270 (3rd Cir. 1980).
29 Id. at 271-73. The delayed flight was to return plaintiff to the United States; the
tickets for the trip were purchased there; the injury occurred in the midst of a round trip
package; and the suffering continued after his return to the United States.
30 653 F.2d 812 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 929 (1981).
31 Id. at 820.
32 647 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1981).
33 Demurrage is a daily fine assessed against a chartering party if the ship is not re-
turned to its owner by the end of the charter period. BrAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 389 (5th
ed. 1979).
34 Gemini Shipping, 647 F.2d at 319. The court stated that "the guarantee was part and
parcel of the rice sale." Id.
35 708 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1983).
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found substantial contact. From this perspective, the course of con-
duct clearly centered in the United States. 36
The District of Columbia Circuit interpreted the FSIA's territo-
riality clause in Gilson v. Republic of Ireland.37 In Gilson plaintiff
brought suit against two agencies of the Irish government for con-
verting his quartz crystal equipment, business expertise, and patent
rights. Although defendant's acts were consummated in Ireland,
their roots were traced to Irish activity in the United States sufficient
to hold defendant liable.38
The Fifth Circuit applied the substantial contacts clause in
Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp.,39 a tort and contract action
against a Dominican Republic airline for involuntarily deporting
plaintiffs from the Dominican Republic. Defendant had sold airline
tickets and tourist cards in the United States, including those
purchased by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' grievances stemmed from the air-
line's ticket sales, which provided the necessary link to the airline's
commercial conduct in the United States. 40
Although the appellate courts had heard several commercial ex-
ceptions cases, none had squarely addressed the doing business is-
sue. The concept, however, had been litigated in several district
courts prior to Vencedora. Harris v. Vao Intourist, Moscow,4 1 for exam-
ple, expressly repudiated the application of doing business to the
substantial contact clause.42 Harris concerned the death of an Amer-
ican in a fire at a state-owned hotel in Moscow. The court refused to
regard the Soviet Union's unrelated tourism activities within the
United States as sufficient to assert jurisdiction.43
The Harris court's position that the substantial contacts clause
demands a relationship between the cause of action and the defend-
ant's commercial activity in the United States stems from its observa-
tion that the commercial activities exception does not contain
language paralleling a typical state doing business long-arm provi-
36 Id. at 84. The court noted that cargo arrangements took place in the United States,
and that the Ministry had consented to a provision that carriage of goods would not offi-
cially end until the ship unloaded.
37 682 F.2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
38 Id. at 1027. Plaintiffs business was located in Ireland, where he personally di-
rected operations at the time of the alleged misconduct. The court observed that "an
unbroken chain of events" began "when plaintiff contracted with defendant GE in the
United States, with the participation of defendant IDA's New York office, and involving the
active collusion of all defendants to entice plaintiff to leave the United States for Ireland."
Id.
39 621 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1980). See supra note II and accompanying text.
40 Arango, 621 F.2d at 1379-80.
41 481 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
42 The Haris decision has influenced many scholarly works. See Dellapenna, Suing
Foreign Governments and their Corporations, Part IV, 85 CoM. L.J. 364, 365 (1980).
At least one commentator viewed the court's opinion as the settled interpretation of
doing business. Hill, supra note 17, at 224.
43 Harris, 481 F. Supp. at 1061.
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sion.44 Conceding that Congress modeled the FSIA after the District
of Columbia's long-arm statute,45 the court distinguished it from the
"traditional 'doing business' presence basis," by noting that each
provision of the District of Columbia statute requires that the specific
activity described "give rise to the 'claim for relief.' "46
The court in Rio Grande Transport, Inc. v. Compagnie Nationale Al-
gerienne De Navigation47 reached the contrary conclusion. The court's
endorsement of the doing business concept rested upon its belief
that congressional intent mandated a broad interpretation of com-
mercial activity under the FSIA. In Rio Grande Transport several em-
ployees were killed or injured when their ship collided with a CNAN
vessel in the Mediterranean Sea. Despite the absence of a connec-
tion between the accident and CNAN's commercial affairs in the
United States, the court exercised subject matter jurisdiction.48
Within a year, however, the same court in Gibbons v. Udaras na
Gaeltachta49 failed to adopt the doing business concept, although the
facts clearly supported its application, since defendants had con-
ducted substantial unrelated activity in the United States. Instead,
the court relied on connections between the causes of action and de-
fendant's commercial activity in the United States. Plaintiffs brought
suit in the United States against two agencies of the Irish govern-
ment that had lured them into launching an unsuccessful business in
Ireland. The court referred to the parties' negotiations in the United
States, as well as the equipment plaintiffs had purchased in the
United States for use in Ireland, as evidence that defendant had met
the substantial contacts test. The Gibbons court emphasized that the
activities inside the United States were connected with the causes of
action. 50
44 Id. at 1061. The court compared the clause to the "transaction" of business
clauses appearing in many long-arm statutes. From this, it gleaned that Congress had
designed the clause to cover specific business deals in the United States.
45 House REPORT, supra note 17, at 6612. Congress announced that § 1330(b) was
"patterned after the long-arm statute Congress enacted for the District of Columbia." Id.
46 Harris, 481 F. Supp. at 1062. The court also distinguished the D.C. long-arm stat-
ute from that of New York, which upholds traditional doing business as a jurisdictional
basis. Id. at 1059-60. For a good discussion of the substantial contact section and doing
business, see Dellapenna, Part IV, supra note 42, at 365-66.
Other courts have taken a different view of the relationship between the FSIA and the
District of Columbia's long-arm statute. See Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Re-
public of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094, 1109 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 71
(1983). The court found it significant that the legislative history addressed personal juris-
diction, not subject matter jurisdiction, when alluding to the similarity between the FSIA
and the District of Columbia's long-arm statute. The substantial contacts clause, it cau-
tioned, bears no resemblance to the D.C. statute.
47 516 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). For a critique of the holding, see 15 VAND. J.
INT'L L. 615 (1982).
48 Rio Grande, 516 F. Supp. at 1162.
49 549 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). For a detailed analysis of the decision see
Note, Sovereign Immunity, 10 BROOKLYNJ. INT'L L. 255 (1984).
50 Gibbons, 549 F. Supp. at 1109, 1111,
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While both the majority and the dissent in Vencedora relied on
previous appellate court decisions, those decisions concern entirely
different fact situations. In each case, the court recognized that the
action physically had occurred outside the United States. Arango, for
example, dealt with the treatment plaintiffs had received in the Do-
minican Republic. This did not comport with the substantial con-
tacts requirement that the commercial activity occur in the United
States. The courts remedied this problem by viewing the litigated
act as a dependent part of the defendant's commercial activity in the
United States. 5 '
Instead of focusing upon the wrongful delay in unloading the
ship in Egypt, the court in Universe Tankships considered the overall
wheat sale and concluded that the unloading was merely a compo-
nent of a larger affair principally conducted in the United States.52
The court in Sugarnan also attempted to find a bridge to commercial
activity in the United States. In isolation, plaintiffs heart attack in
Mexico does not provide a basis for applying the substantial contacts
clause. As a part of plaintiffs overall commercial dealings with de-
fendant, however, it may be considered a component of commercial
activity in the United States. 53 Linking defendant's act with a specific
commercial activity in the United States was a major factor in these
cases.
54
Unlike earlier court of appeals cases, plaintiffs in Vencedora made
no effort to connect the litigated act to related commercial conduct
in the United States. Instead, they based their claim on defendant's
total volume of commercial activity in the United States. Essentially,
the Vencedora court was asked to examine the substantial contacts
clause from a new perspective.
The Vencedora court conceded that Rio Grande and Universe Tank-
ships could be interpreted as authority for the doing business test.55
The court did not accord much weight to language in Universe Tank-
ships resembling the traditional test: "We believe this reading is too
broad since the parties did not raise the 'doing business' issue. '"56
The court, however, neglected to add that the plaintiff in Universe
Tankships did not need to develop the doing business argument. He
simply tied the problem of unloading into a larger commercial affair
in the United States-the overall wheat sale. Moreover, the Vencedora
court failed to mention that opinions cited in support of the nexus
5' Arango, 621 F.2d at 1379.
52 Universe Tankships, 708 F.2d at 84-85.
53 Sugarman, 626 F.2d at 273.
54 One writer has suggested that in deciding jurisdiction, the courts have elevated
acts motivated by contractual commitments over acts not performed pursuant to a con-
tract. Note, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Commercial Activity: A Confiicts Approach, 83
COLUM. L. REv. 1440, 1491-97 (1983).




test were silent on the doing business issue. The court's tactic for
neutralizing the earlier dictum underscored that plaintiff's argument
distinguishes Vencedora from any previous court of appeals decision.
Facing a case of first impression, the Vencedora court sought ref-
uge in the language of the commercial exceptions section. The court
used the "based upon" phrase in each of the three clauses as a
bridge to analogize to earlier decisions. 57 A literal reading of "based
upon a commercial activity in the United States" suggests that the
substantial contacts clause requires that the litigated act must itself
occur in the United States. In Sugarman the court rejected this inter-
pretation, contrasting the requirements in the other two clauses that
the act occur in or have a direct effect in the United States with the
substantial contacts clause's silence. 58 The Sugarman court presumed
that the omission was deliberate, permitting a court to assert juris-
diction although the act occurred elsewhere. Thus, the "based
upon" phrase did not operate as a restraint on the substantial con-
tacts clause.
The Vencedora court used this established interpretation as a sub-
tle springboard to a more radical proposition: that the "based
upon" phrase mandated that all substantial contact clause cases have
a nexus to the commercial activity in the United States.5 9 According
to Vencedora, the district court in Gibbons had extended the nexus con-
struction of "based upon" from the territoriality clause to the two
other commercial exception clauses. 60 Actually, the Gibbons court
was addressing the silence issue raised in Sugarman.6 1 While dictum
in Gilson discouraged a doing business reading, the court did not ab-
solutely reject the notion: "If plaintiff cannot show the requisite
nexus between defendants' acts . . . in the United States and his
cause of action, then contact with the United States . . will be per-
haps decisively, attenuated. 62
In reading a nexus requirement into the "based upon" phrase
found in all three clauses of the commercial exceptions section,
Vencedora does not add to either the territoriality or direct effects
clauses. Those clauses address causal connection situations, both us-
ing the word "connection." The Vencedora court surmised that Con-
gress had written the "based upon" language into all three clauses,
though functionally the phrase only modifies the substantial contacts
clause.
57 Id. at 200.
58 Sugarman, 626 F.2d at 273.
59 Vencedora, 730 F.2d at 200-02. While the Gilson court had searched for a connec-
tion, its inquiry may be attributed to the specific language of the territoriality clause. Gil-
son, 682 F.2d at 1027.
60 Vencedora, 730 F.2d at 200.
61 Gibbons, 549 F. Supp. at 1109 n.5.
62 Gilson, 682 F.2d at 1027 n.22 (emphasis added).
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At the same time, however, the court agreed with Sugarman that
"based upon" does not mean that under the substantial contacts
clause the act must occur in the United States. 63 Sugarman stated that
the locus of the act is addressed in the other two clauses, so that the
absence of "locus" from the substantial contacts section indicates
that it is not important. If the "based upon" language is construed
to require that the act occur in the United States, it would operate as
a restraint upon the substantial contacts clause, without adding any-
thing to the other two clauses. Sugarman concluded that Congress
would not have written the "based upon" language into all three
clauses intending it to modify only one.64 It may be stated that
Vencedora stands for the Sugarman proposition that Congress did not
intend to add a "locus" restraint on the substantial contacts clause
with the "based upon" phrase. Yet Vencedora adds the same phrase
to all three clauses to require a nexus although only one clause is
affected. This inconsistent treatment of the "based upon" phrase
weakens the decision.
Despite this inconsistency, the Vencedora opinion embodies the
spirit of earlier court of appeals decisions. Previous decisions
avoided the doing business interpretation, even in instances in which
it could be asserted, suggesting reservations regarding its applicabil-
ity. Many plaintiffs had an opportunity to argue doing business in
the alternative, yet the record is devoid of any such attempts.
Although doing business was not asserted in Sugarman and Arango,
the defendants were airline companies, a category of commercial ac-
tivity specifically mentioned in the legislative history as a "regular
course of commercial activity."'6 5 Similarly, the plaintiff in Gilson did
not attempt to emphasize the defendant's unrelated contacts with the
United States.6 6
In another sense, however, Vencedora deviates from the spirit of
earlier cases. While the court marshalled support of the nexus ap-
proach for the sake of uniformity, it resulted in a finding for defend-
ant-cutting against a line of decisions in which the defendants'
claims of sovereign immunity were dismissed.6 7 This past bias
against the defendant, to a large extent, may be attributed to the
courts' obvious efforts to help aggrieved American citizens who
otherwise would be left without a remedy. 68 Yet this explanation is
not fully satisfactory. Attempting to achieve uniformity, Vencedora
63 Vencedora, 730 F.2d at 200.
64 Sugarman, 626 F.2d at 273.
65 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 6606-07.
66 Gilson, 682 F.2d at 1027.
67 In the appellate decisions previously discussed (Sugarman, Velidor, Gemini, Universe
Tankships, Gilson, and Arango), the courts found a basis for asserting jurisdiction over the
foreign defendants. While the courts invoked different reasoning, their uniformity in re-
sult is notable.
68 See Gilson, 682 F.2d at 1028.
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cites Velidor, which held that foreign plaintiffs could sue a foreign
government in a United States court.69 This holding was based on a
very attenuated substantial contact: defendant's ship fortuitously
had sailed into an American court after plaintiffs had quit on the high
seas.
70
Nevertheless, the call for uniformity is strong, and future courts
will undoubtedly refer to Vencedora when confronted with the sub-
stantial contacts clause. The call for consistency does not conflict
with any previous commercial exceptions cases. Also, the ease with
which the nexus test may be applied favors its widespread adoption.
The Vencedora decision essentially draws a line beyond which a
foreign governmental entity could not be subject to suit. The case
signals a halt to the steady erosion of the sovereign immunity doc-
trine. By employing a nexus test, however, the court solidified previ-
ously established inroads on the doctrine. Henceforth plaintiffs will
have to demonstrate a link, albeit a tenuous one, between the cause
of action and the defendant's commercial activity in the United
States before a court will hear a case on its merits.
The Vencedora court mishandled an ideal opportunity to resolve a
confused area of FSIA law. The significant shortcomings of the deci-
sion stem from the court's myopic preoccupation with statutory con-
struction. The reasoning in Vencedora is strained because it rests on
the dubious presupposition that Congress had considered the doing
business issue and had incorporated its decision into the statute.
Congress, however, drafted the FSIA in a vague fashion to give the
courts wide latitude. 7' Rather than acknowledging that the technical
language o f the FSIA was meant only as a general guide, the court
insisted on scrutinizing the FSIA to uncover congressional intent.
The court should have looked beyond the statute to ascertain
legislative intent. At times the court exhibited such a willingness, as
when it declared that the doing business test was not internationally
respected. The United States adopted the restrictive sovereign im-
munity doctrine to conform to the international mainstream. 72 A
strong argument may be made that Congress did not intend to stray
from these waters by adopting the more controversial doing business
construction. Unfortunately, the court failed to develop fully this
interpretation.
Had the Vencedora court approached the doing business issue
from a broader perspective, it is not certain that it would have im-
posed the nexus test on the substantial contacts clause. Although
the need for international respect had operated as a restraint, Con-
69 Velidor, 653 F.2d at 814.
70 Id. at 820.
71 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 6615.
72 Id. at 6607-08.
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gress clearly passed the FSIA to help American citizens obtain judg-
ments against foreign defendants. 73 In this light, a doing business
interpretation seems desirable.74
The Vencedora court clarified this area, inasmuch as it reduced
the substantial contacts clause to a mirror of its two counterparts,
which explicitly mandate a nexus-a result probably not intended by
the drafters of the commercial exceptions section. Perhaps future
courts will question this result, and will discover a sounder founda-
tion for supporting a commercial nexus requirement in "substantial
contact" clause suits.
-RONALD ROGERS
73 Id. at 6505.
74 The fact that this case did not involve an American plaintiff weakens this argument,
but hardly justifies Vencedora's dismissal of the entire doing business concept.
Before Congress adopted the FSIA, foreign plaintiffs were precluded from suing for-
eign defendants in United States courts due to a lack of diversity. Dellapenna, Part IV,
supra note 42, at 370. TheJustice Department advised Congress that the proposed legisla-
tion would not turn the nation's courts into "international courts of claims." Id. From
this, one may glean that Congress intended to favor American plaintiffs over foreigners.
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